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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant Halton Flowers pled guilty to statutory rape and was sentenced 
to ten years with the first five years fixed. Appellant timely appealed and, in a 
brief filed on August 3, 2009, asserted that the district court abused its discretion 
by imposing that sentence. Thereafter, Mr. Flowers brought an Idaho Criminal 
Rule 33 motion for withdrawal of guilty plea in the district court. The instant 
appeal was suspended pending its resolution. The district court ultimately denied 
said Motion. 
Appellant has filed contemporaneously herewith a motion to file this 
supplemental brief augmenting the original Appellant's brief and challenging the 
denial of his Rule 33 motion. 
Course of Proceedings 
The pre-appeal proceedings have already been described in Appellant's 
initial opening brief and will not be repeated here. While the appeal was pending, 
Mr. Flowers filed a pro se Motion to withdraw plea of guilty and affidavit in 
support on September 25, 2009. Counsel was appointed, and a hearing was 
held on November 10, 2009. The court denied the Motion at the hearing, which 
was memorialized in a written Order entered that same day. 1 
1 The Motion to withdraw guilty plea (hereinafter Motion), Affidavit in support 
(Affidavit), and Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (Order) have 
previously been augmented to the record. 
1 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred in denying the Rule 33 motion 
for withdrawal of guilty plea 
2 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE RULE 33 MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
A. Standard of Review 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33 provides as follows in relevant part: 
(c) Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition 
of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court 
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit 
the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea. 
I.C.R. 33. 
The Idaho Supreme Court described the standard for review for a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea in State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 177 P.3d 966 (2008): 
The decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the 
sound discretion of the district court, and such discretion should be 
liberally applied. Jackson, 96 Idaho at 587, 532 P.2d at 929. The 
review of the denial of such a motion is limited to determining 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as 
distinguished from arbitrary action. Id. 
Id., 177 P.3d p. 969. 
B. The Motion, Hearing, and Court's Ruling 
Mr. Flowers asserted several grounds for withdrawal of his guilty plea in 
his pro se Motion and Affidavit. First, Mr. Flowers asserted that his guilty plea 
was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made because he was not 
advised prior to entry of his plea, by either the court or counsel, of the 
requirement that he register as a sex offender in violation of I.C.R. 11(d)(2) 
(Motion, p. 2; Affidavit, p. 1-2.) 
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Second, Mr. Flowers asserted that his plea was not voluntary due to the 
state's breach of the plea agreement, both at sentencing and at the later Rule 35 
hearing. The background for this issue follows. 
At the change of plea hearing, defense counsel stated the (unwritten) plea 
agreement was as follows: 
MR. DYKMAN: Yes, Your Honor, we do have a plea agreement on 
this man, also. He is going to plead guilty to statutory rape. The 
State's going to recommend three fixed, seven indeterminate and 
they're going to dismiss all other charges in all other cases. We're 
free to make our own recommendations at sentencing. 
COURT: Alright, Mr. Hiedeman. 
MR. HIEDEMEN: That's correct, Your Honor, I would move at this 
time, pursuant to that agreement, to dismiss counts two and three 
of the information. 
COURT: Okay. That motion is granted. Count two, lewd conduct 
with a child under sixteen; and count three, attempted lewd conduct 
with a child under sixteen, will be dismissed upon defendant 
entering a plea of guilty to rape. And, Mr. Hiedeman, is this going to 
be charged as statutory rape? 
MR. HIEDEMAN: Yes sir. 
Change of Plea Tr. 11/10/2008, p.1, In. 13-p.2, In. 3. 
The first problem arose at the sentencing. When stating his objections to 
the PSI, defense counsel argued as follows: 
MR. DYKMAN: Page eleven, Your Honor, I just thought this was 
unusual, on that first paragraph at the very end, it says Additionally 
Mr. Flowers did indicate during the interview that he touched the 
breasts of A.T. I just thought on a dismissed charge, I talked to my 
client about that. He indicates to me that what happened was that 
the probation/parole officer solicited that comment from him. I think 
it's probably inappropriate. I would probably ask the Court to strike 
that because it's - he's never - even though he was charged, he 
wasn't convicted of that and I just think it is inappropriate to have it 
in the PSI. But again, that's my opinion on it, Your Honor. 
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COURT: That was dismissed? 
MR. DYKMAN: Yes. So I just think it was inappropriate to have it in 
the PSI in the comment. It's almost like boot-strapping. 
COURT: Okay, that's the - where he touched the breasts of A.T., 
a fourteen year female? 
MR. DYKMAN: Yes. 
COURT: Okay, Mr. Pearson, do you have any comments on that? 
MR. PEARSON: Your Honor, I think the Court can give it whatever 
weight's necessary. I would note for the record that that particular 
individual is in the courtroom here today, with her mother. While 
they understand they are not entitled to give a witness impact 
statement, I think the Court can take into consideration the entire 
facts regarding the situation. While there was a plea agreement, I 
think the Court has a right to understand everything that went on 
with Mr. Flowers so it can sentence him appropriately, based upon 
all the facts. 
f) 
MR. DYKMAN: I guess I'm concerned - is we have a plea 
agreement. The state's bound by the plea agreement, and they're 
bound to go along with certain recommendations and not comment 
on charges that have been dismissed. 
COURT: Well-
MR. DYKMAN: I think it's inappropriate. 
COURT: Okay, --
MR. DYKMAN: So I'm going to object. 
COURT: Okay. Okay, anything else you want to challenge in the 
presentence report, itself? 
Sentencing Tr. 12/15/08, p. 6, In. 7-p. 7, In. 21 (emphasis added). 
Later on in the hearing while making its sentence recommendation, the 
prosecutor, argued ... "with this type of conduct, and all the other conducts that 
was [sic] surrounded this particular case, this is not a person who should be in 
5 
our community. He is a risk to young ladies." Sentencing Tr. 12/15/08, p. 17, Ins. 
22-25. 
While the state did recommend a sentence of ten years with the first three 
years fixed, the court imposed a sentence of 15 years with the first five years 
fixed. 
Mr. Flowers then brought a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. At 
the hearing on the Rule 35 motion, when the court asked the prosecutor for 
comments, he said: 
Thank you, Your Honor. Whether or not he 13 turned himself in 
Indiana, he ran to Indiana. He had this outstanding. He knew he 
had this outstanding. He failed to appear twice on this particular 
charge because he was gone. And then, if the Court will recall, he 
may have initiated extradition proceedings, but when the state 
determined how much it was going to cost to go get him, we had to 
have three hearings on whether or not we were spending too much. 
I mean, it's not as if this individual was just like, alright, I'm wrong, 
come get me, let's get this taken care of. He wanted to fight it the 
whole step of the way, and that's what happened. I don't think this 
is as honest and true as we're being lead to believe here today. ! 
don't think granting the Rule 35 is appropriate and we would ask 
you to keep his sentence the same. 
Rule 35 hearing 1/26/09, p. 4, Ins. 12-25 (emphasis added). 
The court denied the Rule 35 motion. 
Based on the above, Mr. Flowers argued in his Motion and Affidavit that 
the breach was twofold. First, Mr. Flowers complained that at sentencing, the 
state breached the plea agreement by acting inconsistent with the plea 
agreement which included the dismissal of charges against him. While Mr. 
Flowers stated that he is not addressing whether the court can or cannot 
consider dismissed charges, the state could not bring them up or argue them. 
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Mr. Flowers contended the state did just that when it controverted his counsel's 
objection to the PSI's inclusion of a dismissed charge and instead argued that 
the court could and should consider the dismissed charges in sentencing 
because it argued that the court could consider everything and sentence him 
appropriately based on all the facts. 
Moreover, even after defense counsel reminded the state of the plea 
bargain, later, the state's argument included the dismissed charges when it 
included in it "and all the other conducts that was surrounding this particular 
case." Mr. Flowers argued that the state's comments had a cumUlative effect 
which is shown by the fact that he did not receive its recommended sentence of 
ten years with three fixed, but the substantially increased sentence of 15 years 
with five fixed. (Affidavit, p. 2-3.) 
Mr. Flowers also argued that the state breached the plea agreement in the 
Rule 35 hearing by arguing against his request for leniency and relief from the 
sentence which exceeded that recommended by the state. In his Affidavit, Mr. 
Flowers stated that while the plea agreement was unwritten and ambiguous as to 
the duration of the sentence recommendation, it was his understanding that the 
state's recommendation applied to his case overall and not just at the 
sentencing. He did not believe that the state's recommendation was subject to 
change simply because the court did something different at the sentencing. He 
understood the Rule 35 hearing to be an extension of the sentencing because it 
is only to possibly reduce or modify a sentence. (Affidavit, p. 2.) 
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Finally, Mr. Flowers' third argument in his Motion concerned the court not 
having actually accepted his plea of guilty, which has the following background. 
At the beginning of the change of plea colloquy, after establishing the 
factual basis, the court stated that it accepted the plea of guilty to count one and 
granted the state's motion to dismiss the other charges. (Change of Plea Tr. 
11/10108, p. 3.) After that, it went on to asking questions relevant to the required 
determinations under I.C.R. 11 (c), to wit, that the plea was voluntary, that he was 
informed of the consequences of the plea (he was actually only informed of the 
maximum imprisonment possible), that he was informed of his rights, and 
whether any promises had been made. (Change of Plea Tr. 11/10108, p. 3-6.) 
After that, the court asked of defense counsel whether there was any 
reason it should not accept the plea of guilty, to which defense counsel answered 
no, but then a discussion ensued about a mental evaluation. (Change of Plea Tr. 
11/10108, p. 6-7.) The court then asked the prosecutor whether there was any 
reason why it should not accept the plea of guilty, to which the prosecutor 
answered no, and then the mental health evaluation discussion was continued. 
(Change of Plea Tr. 11/101088, p. 7.) Then the court went on to discuss the PSI 
form and other matters, never returning to whether it should accept the plea and 
never stating it was doing so or adjudging Mr. Flowers guilty of the crime. 
In other words, the court never actually accepted the plea of guilty after it 
had made the determinations required by I.C.R. 11(c) or adjudged him guilty of 
the crime. Mr. Flowers argued in his Motion and Affidavit that the court did not 
accept the guilty plea, and he was never formally adjudged guilty under I.C. § 19-
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101. Since he had never been adjudged guilty, he could not be sentenced (and 
thus his sentence was illegal, and he was being unlawfully held in prison ). 
However, more to the point, the pre-sentencing "just reason" standard for 
withdrawal of his guilty plea should apply, not the post-sentence "manifest 
injustice" standard. (Motion, p. 2; Affidavit, p. 2.) 
Again, there was a hearing on the Motion (at which Mr. Flowers was not 
personally present). Unfortunately, neither his attorney nor the prosecutor came 
close to understanding what his arguments really were (or the correct responses 
to them), so their comments will not be discussed here. While the court did 
somewhat better when it recited the arguments that it believed the Motion and 
Affidavit to make, its rulings show that it nevertheless missed the point. 
For example, at the hearing, regarding the breach of plea agreement 
issue, the court held " ... I think would be subject to the direct appeal that he has 
pending before the Idaho Supreme Court at this point in time .... " (Hearing 
11/10109, p. 3, Ins. 22-24.) The court did not further address the breach of plea 
agreement at the hearing or in its written Order memorializing its rulings filed the 
same day. 
The court also stated at the hearing that there was nothing in the record 
that indicates it was an illegal sentence or that the court did not accept his plea to 
the charge. (Hearing 11/10109, p. 3-4.) 
In its written Order, the court held as follows regarding the argument that 
the court failed to advise Mr. Flowers of the sex offender registration requirement 
in violation of I.C.R. 11(d)(2): 
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The Defendant further asserts that he was not informed of the fact 
he would have to register as a sex offender and the judge's failure 
to notify him of this would justify allowing him to withdraw his guilty 
plea. Even if that were the case failure of a judge to notify a 
defendant that he will have to register as a sex offender is not 
sufficient cause to allow for the withdraw of a guilty plea. The 
requirement of sex offender registration is not a direct consequence 
of a guilty plea. Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 982 P.2d 931(1999). 
Sex offender registration in the state of Idaho is not punitive, but 
remedial. id. 100. 
Order, p. 2. 
The court also stated that there was nothing in the record that indicates 
that the Defendant did not understand the proceedings or was confused as to 
what he was pleading guilty to, and the district court followed the constitutional 
requirements of due process in accepting the Defendant's plea. The court 
concluded that it could not find manifest injustice resulted in the acceptance of 
the guilty plea and, therefore, denied the Motion. (Order, p. 2-3.) 
C. The Court Erred Denying the Motion Based on the Breach of the Plea 
Agreement 
To begin with, the court obviously erred in ruling that the breach of the 
plea agreement argument should be brought in the instant direct appeal rather 
than in the district court via the Motion. While the issue that the state breached a 
plea agreement can be brought for the first time on appeal as fundamental error, 
it does not mean that the district court should not decide the issue in the first 
instance when it has the opportunity to do so. Regardless, the issue is now 
properly before this Court. 
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As explained by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 
299, 77 P.3d 988 (Ct.App. 2003): 
It is well established that "when a plea rests in any significant 
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can 
be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise 
must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 
S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 433 (1971). This principle is 
derived from the Due Process Clause and the fundamental rule 
that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary and intelligent. 
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546-47, 
81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442-43 (1984); If the prosecution has breached its 
promise given in a plea agreement, whether that breach was 
intentional or inadvertent, it cannot be said that the defendant's plea 
was knowing and voluntary, for the defendant has been led to plead 
guilty on a false premise. In such event, the defendant will be 
entitled to relief. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499, 30 
L.Ed.2d at 433; Mabry, 467 U.S. at 508-09, 104 S.Ct. at 2546-47, 
81 L.Ed.2d at 442-43; As a remedy, the court may order specific 
performance of the agreement or may permit the defendant to 
withdraw the guilty plea. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. at 
499, 30 L.Ed.2d at 433; .... 
The prosecution's obligation to recommend a sentence promised in 
a plea agreement does not carry with it the obligation to make the 
recommendation enthusiastically. A prosecutor may not circumvent 
a plea agreement, however, through words or actions that convey a 
reservation about a promised recommendation, nor may a 
prosecutor impliedly disavow the recommendation as something 
which the prosecutor no longer supports. Although prosecutors 
need not use any particular form of expression in recommending an 
agreed sentence, "their overall conduct must be reasonably 
consistent with making such a recommendation, rather than the 
reverse." 
Id., p. 301-302 (internal citations omitted). 
As further explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in the recent case of 
State v. Lampien, _ Idaho _, 2009 WL 4928357 (2009): 
Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law 
freely reviewed by this Court in accordance with contract law 
standards. State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho, 71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 
(2005). A claim that the State breached a plea agreement affects 
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whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the 
plea agreement, and therefore goes to the foundation or basis of a 
defendant's rights. !d. at 74, 106 P.3d at 400. If the State breaches 
a promise made to a defendant in exchange for a guilty plea, the 
defendant is constitutionally entitled to relief. !d. 
!d., 2009 WL 4928357, p. 8. 
Again, there were two parts to the plea bargain in this case, a sentence 
recommendation and also the dismissal of charges. Regarding the dismissed 
charges, regardless of whether or not the court could sua sponte consider them, 
the state acted inconsistently with its promise to Mr. Flowers when it argued that 
the court could and should do so. 
As shown in the passages above, when defense counsel objected to the 
inclusion of information regarding a dismissed charge in the PSI, the state 
advised the court that a victim of the dismissed charge was in the courtroom and 
argued that despite the plea bargain, the court can take the entire situation into 
account and sentence Mr. Flowers appropriately based upon all the facts 2 
In response, defense counsel expressly declared that under the plea 
agreement the state was bound to not comment on the dismissed charges. 
Significantly, the prosecutor did not controvert this statement or otherwise 
respond at the time. Instead, he waited until his sentencing argument, and then 
argued that Mr. Flowers should not be in the community and was a risk to young 
ladies based on all the conducts surrounding this case. While the state was 
attempting to be surreptitious with its argument, perhaps because it understood 
2 Not incidentally, since the rape charge carried a maximum sentence of 
life in prison, any bargain from the dismissal of other charges is illusory if the 
state can argue they should form part of the basis of the sentence. 
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at that point it could not properly comment on the dismissed charges, its 
reference to not just the instant conduct, but to all the conducts surrounding the 
instant case and use of the plural "ladies," was not even a thinly veiled reference 
to the dismissed charges. 
Even if the state really believed that it retained the right under the plea 
agreement to comment on the dismissed charges, it needed to say so when 
defense counsel stated his understanding was otherwise, rather than stand 
silent and do it anyway later in the hearing. Its silence in the face of the defense 
counsel's description of its obligation under that term should be considered to be 
the state's agreement therewith. In any event, under contract principles, an 
ambiguous term in a plea bargain should be construed in the defendant's favor. 3 
Appellant further asserts that the state is precluded from now claiming that 
it could properly comment on the dismissed charges because it also did not 
make this claim when the breach was raised in the Motion. In other words, the 
state failed to establish a contrary understanding of the plea agreement by an 
affidavit or even a representation by the prosecutor at the hearing. 
To conclude regarding this issue, Appellant asserts that the breach at 
sentencing is twofold (but either one is sufficient for relief here), the first instance 
occurring when the state argued that the court should consider the dismissed 
charges and brought up the other victim, and the second when it later referenced 
all the conducts. 
3 While this case is not final and so is not yet being relied upon as 
authority, State v. Peterson, _ Idaho_, 2010 WL 424355, p. 4 (Ct.App. 2/8/10), 
came to these same conclusions. 
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Appellant also asserts that the state breached the plea agreement during 
the Rule 35 hearing. There, the state violated its promise to recommend that Mr. 
Flowers receive a sentence of ten years with the first three years fixed by arguing 
that the court should not reduce, but keep the same, the imposed sentence of 15 
years with the first five years fixed. 
As shown above, at the change of plea hearing the defense described the 
agreement by saying that the state is going to recommend three fixed and seven 
indeterminate, to which the prosecutor agreed. There was no term in the plea 
agreement which would limit the recommendation only to the initial sentencing 
proceeding and not to a Rule 35 hearing. 
In other words, the promise was for the state to recommend a particular 
sentence, not to recommend it at sentencing. There was simply no term which 
provided that said recommendation would be at made only at the sentencing. If 
the state did not want to be bound in that fashion, it should have said so, but it 
did not. Thus, since in our case the state did not simply agree to make a 
recommendation at sentencing, it is not like State v. Cole, 135 Idaho 269, 16 
P.3d 945 (Ct.App. 2000), where the state did not breach its agreement to remain 
silent at sentencing by its action at the Rule 35 hearing. 
Rather, the more instructive case is the decision in State v. Lampien, _ 
Idaho _, 2009 WL 4928357 (Idaho 2009). There, the Supreme Court held that 
since the agreement was to be bound to the sentence agreement, the state was 
required to commit to the sentencing recommendation at every stage of the 
proceedings. 
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Our case is the same; the agreement was to make a sentencing 
recommendation, as opposed to agreeing to make a recommendation at 
sentencing. Thus, since the state did not limit the scope of its agreement to 
make a particular sentence recommendation, it was bound to adhere to it in 
subsequent proceedings and so breached the plea agreement when it did not. 
Further, while Appellant asserts that the fact that there was no limitation to 
the duration of the recommendation is clear from the record, to the extent that 
additional evidence regarding the understanding of the parties is necessary, it 
exists. Mr. Flowers stated in his Affidavit that his understanding of the plea 
agreement was that the recommendation requirement extended to the Rule 35 
hearing. This swom evidence was uncontroverted by the state which, despite an 
opportunity to do so, did not offer a contrary understanding, be it swom or even a 
simple representation at the hearing on the Motion. Thus the only evidence is 
that the sentence recommendation term extended to the Rule 35 hearing. 
Finally, even if the term was ambiguous, again, it should be construed in the 
defendant's favor. 
To summarize, the state breached the plea agreement at the sentencing 
and at the Rule 35 hearing, but either breach is sufficient to entitle Mr. Flowers to 
relief. As explained above, the state's breach of the plea agreement resulted in a 
plea which was not voluntary and intelligent and is also a violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution (5th & 14th Amendments). 
Appellant further asserts that such a breach is a due process violation under 
Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution as well. 
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Mr. Flowers was denied the benefit of his bargain, and, as mentioned 
above, two remedies are available, to wit, specific performance or withdrawal of 
the plea agreement. Here, Mr. Flowers requests that he be allowed to withdraw 
his guilty plea, and this matter be remanded to a different judge. 
But further still, Mr. Flowers points out that even if the plea agreement is 
considered to have been voluntarily and intelligently made despite the breach, 
the state still took on certain obligations in the plea bargain which were not met. 
Puckett v. United States, _ U.S. _, 129 S.Ct. 1423 (2009). According to that 
case, he is still entitled to seek a remedy, which may include rescission of the 
agreement whereby he can take back the consideration he furnished by 
withdrawing his plea, or specific performance, where he is resentenced with the 
state honoring its promises to him. Id. p. 1430. In our case, given the multiple 
breaches at multiple hearings, Appellant contends that withdrawal of the plea is 
the most appropriate remedy, but alternatively and secondarily requests a 
resentencing, and that it be before a different judge because of those multiple 
breaches. 
To conclude, while the district court in this case erred by not addressing 
the breach of the plea agreement issue in conjunction with the Motion, in any 
event, the state did commit a breach which entitles Mr. Flowers to relief. 
D. The District Court Erred by Denying the Motion Due to the Violations of 
I.C.R. 11 
To begin with, I.C.R.11 provides as follows in relevant part: 
16 
Rule 11. Pleas 
(c) Acceptance of Plea of Guilty. Before a plea of guilty is 
accepted, the record of the entire proceedings, including 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must show: 
(1) The voluntariness of the plea. 
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, 
including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct 
consequences which may apply. 
(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the 
defendant would waive the right against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront 
witnesses against the defendant. 
(4) The defendant was informed of the nature of the charge against 
the defendant. 
(5) Whether any promises have been made to the defendant, or 
whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and. 
if so, the nature of the agreement and that the defendant was 
informed that the court is not bound by any promises or 
recommendation from either party as to punishment. 
(d) Other advisories upon acceptance of plea. The district judge 
shall, prior to entry of a guilty plea or the making of factual 
admissions during a plea colloquy, instruct on the following: 
(1) The court shall inform all defendants that if the defendant is not 
a citizen of the United States, the entry of a plea or making of 
factual admissions could have consequences of deportation or 
removal, inability to obtain legal status in the United States, or 
denial of an application for United States citizenship. 
(2) If the defendant is pleading guilty to any offense requiring 
registration on the sex offender registry, the court shall inform the 
defendant of such registration requirements. 
(3) If the defendant is waiving his right to appeal or other post-
conviction proceedings as part of his guilty plea, and such condition 
of the plea has been called to the attention of the court, the court 
shall confirm with the defendant his awareness of the waiver of 
appeal or other proceedings. 
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(e) Plea Advisory Form. As an aid in taking a plea of guilty, the 
court may require the defendant to fill out and submit the plea 
advisory form found in Appendix A of these rules. In addition to the 
form, the court must make a record showing: 
(1) The defendant understands the nature of the charge(s), 
including any mental element such as intent, knowledge, state of 
mind; 
(2) The defendant understands the maximum and minimum 
punishments, and any other direct consequences which may apply; 
(3) The defendant understood the contents of the guilty plea 
advisory form, and the defendant's plea is voluntary. 
I.C.R. 11 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Flowers raised two issues regarding the change of plea hearing. First, 
he asserted that his plea was invalid because he had not been advised 
beforehand of the requirement he register as a sex offender. 
The district court's ruling was, again, that under Ray v. State,133 Idaho 
96, 982 P.2d 931 (1999), sex offender registration was an indirect consequence 
of a plea of guilty, so Mr. Flowers did not need to be advised of it prior to 
pleading guilty. 
This ruling neglects the fact that after Ray was decided, I.C.R. 11 was 
amended, and now subsection (d)(2) expressly requires that the court shall 
advise the defendant of the sex offender registration requirement. Thus the 
instant violation is not the one rejected in Ray. to wit, of I.C.R. 11 (c)(2), but rather 
of I.C.R. 11 (d)(2). 
18 
In our case, the district court did not comply with I.C.R. 11(d)(2) and so 
violated a mandatory provision of the Rule. Regardless of whether or not sex 
offender registration has previously been deemed an indirect consequence, Mr. 
Flowers was not advised of a consequence of which he was now required to be 
advised, and thus the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. While 
Appellant asserts that this rises to the level of a constitutional due process 
violation, this is actually not even required. As the Court of Appeals explained in 
State v. Stone, _ Idaho_, 208 P.3d 734 (Ct.App. 2009): 
If a plea was not taken in compliance with constitutional due 
process standards, which require that a guilty plea be made 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, then "manifest injustice" or 
the lower standard of "just reason" will be established as a matter 
of law. However, a constitutional defect in the plea is not 
necessary in order to show either a "just reason" or "manifest 
injustice." 
Id., p. 737 (internal citations omitted). 
Thus Appellant asserts that the court's failure to provide the mandatory 
advisory is sufficient to allow withdrawal of the plea, regardless of whether it is a 
violation of the Constitution or just the Rule, because either way Mr. Flowers was 
not advised of what he had to be. As to the violation itself, it is indisputable that 
Mr. Flowers was not advised of the sex offender registration requirement prior to 
entry of his plea. 
In addition to the uncontroverted evidence from his Affidavit, a review of 
the change of plea hearing shows that Mr. Flowers was not advised of the sex 
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offender registration requirement during it, since it was never mentioned. Nor 
was it mentioned in the guilty plea questionnaire he completed.4 (R., p. 163-154.) 
In conclusion, since the court erred when it violated I.C.R.11 (d)(2) by 
failing to provide the mandatory advisory, the court also erred by denying the 
Motion for this reason. 
Finally, Appellant asserts that a further violation of I.C.R. 11 occurred and 
is otherwise relevant here. As Mr. Flowers' Motion explained, the court never 
actually accepted his guilty plea nor did the court adjudge him to be guilty, which 
then brings into play Idaho Code § 19-101: 
19-101. Legal conviction necessary to punishment 
No person can be punished for a public offense except upon a legal 
conviction in a court having jurisdiction thereof. 
I.C. § 19-101. 
In State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273, 581 P.2d 319 (1978), the Supreme 
Court interpreted this statute (the case concerned the withheld judgment statute) 
and held: 
We conclude that for purposes of I.C. section 19-101 conviction 
occurs when a verdict or plea of guilty is accepted by the court. 
Accordingly, where a verdict or plea of guilty has been accepted by 
the court but judgment on that plea or verdict has been withheld, 
section 19-101 does not preclude the imposition of criminal 
punishment, fines and imprisonment, as conditions of that withheld 
judgment. 
Id., p. 278 (emphasis added). 
4 The guilty plea questionnaire in the record is not the same as the plea advisory 
form appended to the Rule 11 pursuant to the amendment effective July 1, 2007, 
even though the change of plea was in November 2008. 
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Thus, according to Mr. Flowers, since the court never actually accepted 
his guilty plea nor adjudged him guilty, he was not convicted, which means two 
things: first, he is being held in prison, in violation of the law, since he could not 
be sentenced without being convicted, and second, since he was not sentenced, 
the pre-sentence standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea should apply, to wit, just 
reason, rather than the post-sentence standard of manifest injustice. 
While Appellant continues these arguments on appeal, he also contends 
that there is an additional violation of I.C.R. 11 present as well. A close review 
of the change of plea hearing shows that the court did state that it accepts the 
plea of guilty, but it did so at the beginning, right after it established the factual 
basis. (Change of Plea Tr. 11/10108, p. 3.) The court then went on to question 
Mr. Flowers regarding whether the plea was voluntary and whether he was made 
any promises, partially advised him of the consequences, and advised him of his 
rights. After these required inquires, however, the court never again states that it 
accepts the guilty plea. Rather, it starts to discuss it and then appears to 
become distracted by other matters before doing so and never actually returns to 
the task at hand and accepts the guilty plea or adjudges Mr. Flowers guilty. 
I.C.R. 11(c) provides as follows in relevant part: 
(c) Acceptance of Plea of Guilty. Before a plea of guilty is 
accepted, the record of the entire proceedings, including 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must show: 
(1) The voluntariness of the plea. 
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, 
including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct 
consequences which may apply. 
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(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the 
defendant would waive the right against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront 
witnesses against the defendant. 
(4) The defendant was informed of the nature of the charge against 
the defendant. 
(5) Whether any promises have been made· to the defendant, or 
whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and 
if so, the nature of the agreement and that the defendant was 
informed that the court is not bound by any promises or 
recommendation from either party as to punishment. 
I.C.R. 11 (emphasis added). 
Clearly, the Rule requires that the court establish that the plea of guilty is 
valid before it is accepted, not after. Thus, by accepting the plea of guilty before 
and not after establishing the requirements for a valid plea mandated by I.C.R. 
11 (c), the court violated that provision.5 
Therefore, since the court again violated I.C.R. 11 by not following the 
requirements of the Rule when taking the plea, the plea is invalid. Thus, in 
addition to Mr. Flowers' arguments about his sentence being illegal and the pre-
sentencing standard applying, Appellant altematively asserts that if his plea is 
nevertheless considered to have been accepted, albeit incorrectly, then he 
should also be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea for this reason. 
5 While it does not matter to the analysis since there is still an I.C.R. 11 violation, 
Appellant suspects that what the court was really meaning to do at the beginning 
of the hearing was to state that it accepted the plea bargain, as opposed to the 
guilty plea. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Flowers respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Order 
denying his Rule 33 motion and remand this matter to the district court for 
withdrawal of the guilty plea, or alternatively and secondarily, for resentencing 
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